The Women's Equality Party:Emergence, organisation and challenges by Evans, Elizabeth & Kenny, Meryl
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Women's Equality Party
Citation for published version:
Evans, E & Kenny, M 2019, 'The Women's Equality Party: Emergence, organisation and challenges',
Political Studies, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 855-871. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718812885
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1177/0032321718812885
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Political Studies
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Jan. 2020
	 1	
THE	WOMEN’S	EQUALITY	PARTY:	EMERGENCE,	ORGANISATION	
AND	CHALLENGES		
	
ELIZABETH	EVANS	AND	MERYL	KENNY	
	
Accepted	for	publication	in	Political	Studies	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT	
	
Women's	political	parties	are	designed	to	increase	women's	representation	in	politics.	More	
than	thirty	have	been	established	in	Europe	since	1987,	yet	there	has	been	little	systematic	
analysis	of	why	and	when	they	emerge,	how	they	organize,	and	what	challenges	they	face.	
We	 argue	 that	 the	 study	 of	women's	 parties	 can	 offer	 insights	 into	 questions	 concerning	
inter	and	 intra-party	power	 relations	and	the	relationship	between	social	movements	and	
political	 parties,	whilst	 also	 contributing	 to	broader	debates	 around	 the	 'big	questions'	 of	
representation,	 gender	 (in)equality,	 and	 the	 dynamics	 of	 political	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion.	
This	article	explores	these	issues	through	a	case	study	analysis	of	the	UK's	Women's	Equality	
Party.	Drawing	upon	original	empirical	research	undertaken	with	party	activists	and	officials,	
we	argue	that	the	party's	impact	has	been	constrained	by	wider	organizational	logics	and	an	
unequal	party	system,	whilst	it	has	so	far	adhered	to	traditional	(male-dominated)	patterns	
of	party	organisation.	
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INTRODUCTION		
	
The	Women’s	Equality	Party	began	with	a	 (seemingly)	 throw-away	comment	made	at	 the	
London	Women	of	the	World	Festival	in	March	2015,	from	author	and	journalist	Catherine	
Mayer.	Frustrated	by	a	panel	discussion	on	women	in	politics,	Mayer	made	an	off-the-cuff	
intervention	from	the	audience:	‘Let’s	form	a	women’s	party	and	see	what	happens.	I’ll	be	
in	the	bar	afterwards	if	anyone	wants	to	discuss	it.’		
	
By	the	end	of	the	festival,	Mayer	had	already	acquired	a	party	co-founder	in	comedian	and	
presenter	Sandi	Toksvig.	The	first	meeting	of	the	Women’s	Equality	Party	(WEP)	took	place	
later	that	month,	they	were	officially	registered	with	the	Electoral	Commission	in	July	2015,	
and,	 in	 the	 same	month,	 Reuters	 journalist	 Sophie	Walker	was	 announced	 as	 the	 party’s	
new	 leader.	 	 WEP1	 fielded	 candidates	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 May	 2016	 devolved	 and	
London	 Assembly	 and	mayoral	 elections,	 and	 by	 the	 time	 of	 its	 first	 party	 conference	 in	
November	 of	 the	 same	 year,	 claimed	 to	 have	 acquired	 65,000	 members	 and	 registered	
supporters,	 with	 more	 than	 70	 branches	 across	 the	 four	 nations	 of	 the	 UK	 (Women’s	
Equality	Party,	2016a).	
	
The	 idea	 of	 forming	 a	 women’s	 party	 is	 not	 new.	 Since	 1987	more	 than	 thirty	 women’s	
parties	in	Europe	have	contested	elections	at	the	national	level,	including	in	the	UK	(Cowell-
Meyers,	 2016).	 Women’s	 parties	 have	 had	 some	 electoral	 success	 –	 for	 example,	 the	
Northern	 Ireland	 Women’s	 Coalition	 won	 one	 seat	 in	 the	 inaugural	 Northern	 Ireland	
Assembly	(as	well	as	a	subsequent	council	seat),	whilst	more	recently,	the	Swedish	Feminist	
Initiative	(F!)	won	one	seat	 in	the	2014	European	Parliament	elections,	as	well	as	multiple	
seats	 in	the	2014	Swedish	municipal	elections.	Yet,	until	recently,	there	have	been	few	in-
depth	 studies	 of	women’s	 parties,	 resulting	 in	 little	 systematic	 analysis	 of	why	 and	when	
these	parties	emerge	and	how	they	organise.		We	argue	that	the	study	of	women’s	parties	
can	offer	 insights	 into	questions	 concerning	 inter	and	 intra-party	power	 relations	and	 the	
relationship	 between	 social	 movements	 and	 political	 parties,	 whilst	 also	 contributing	 to	
broader	debates	around	the	‘big	questions’	of	representation,	gender	(in)equality,	and	the	
dynamics	of	political	inclusion	and	exclusion.	
	
This	 article	 seeks	 to	 address	 these	 issues	 through	 a	 qualitative	 case	 study	 analysis	 of	 the	
Women’s	 Equality	 Party	 in	 the	 first	 eighteen	 months	 of	 its	 existence.	 The	 article	 is	
structured	as	follows.	First,	we	review	existing	research	on	women’s	parties,	with	regards	to	
the	origins,	organisation	and	impact	of	women’s	parties,	before	setting	out	our	theoretical	
case	for	the	 importance	of	women’s	parties.	The	next	section	assesses	these	expectations	
against	 the	 case	 of	 the	Women’s	 Equality	 Party,	 drawing	 together	 data	 from	 interviews,	
document	 analysis	 and	 observations	 of	 party	 meetings	 and	 events,	 to	 evaluate	 the	
development	of	a	new	women’s	party	 ‘on	the	ground’.	Our	research	finds	that	 inter-party	
power	dynamics	have	so	far	tended	to	adhere	to	traditional	(male-dominated)	patterns	of	
party	organisation;	whilst	 its	 emergence	alongside,	 rather	 than	 from	within,	 the	women’s	
movement	has	resulted	in	it	being	perceived	as	an	‘outsider’	by	the	wider	movement.	The	
combined	 impact	 of	 the	 electoral	 and	 party	 systems	 also	 raises	 specific	 challenges	 for	 a	
party	 with	 no	 clear	 geographical	 constituency,	 limiting	 its	 ability	 to	 pressure	 other	 UK	
parties	on	women’s	issues.	More	broadly,	we	find	that	whilst	the	party’s	impact	thus	far	has	
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been	 constrained	 by	 wider	 organizational	 logics	 and	 an	 unequal	 party	 system,	 it	 has	
managed	 to	 ‘do	 some	 things	 differently’	 within	 these	 wider	 constraints,	 offering	 new	
opportunities	for	the	representation	of	women	in	British	party	politics.			
	
THEORIZING	WOMEN’S	PARTIES	
	
The	 study	 of	 women’s	 parties	 provides	 important	 insights	 into	 the	 dynamics	 and	
mechanisms	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	within	political	parties.	Mainstream	studies	of	party	
politics	 have	 generally	 failed	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 parties’	 ideologies,	
organizational	 structures,	 procedures	 and	 practices	 are	 ‘saturated	 with	 gender’	 (Childs,	
2008:	xix;	Kenny	and	Verge,	2016:	355).	Traditional	parties	have	historically	been	dominated	
by	 men	 and	 are	 characterized,	 as	 a	 result,	 by	 traditional	 (and	 often	 unacknowledged)	
conceptions	of	gender	relations	that	generally	disadvantage	women.	What	happens,	 then,	
in	women’s	parties,	which	build	their	rationale	for	existing	on	the	inequality	between	men	
and	women	(cf.	Bjarnegard	and	Freidenvall,	2015)?	To	what	extent	do	women’s	parties	‘do	
things	 differently’	 in	 terms	 of	 internal	 power	 and	 organisational	 dynamics?	What	 is	 their	
relationship	 to	 and	 with	 the	 wider	 women’s	 movement?	 Do	 women’s	 parties	 offer	 new	
representational	pathways	for	the	inclusion	of	previously	marginalized	groups?		
	
While	women’s	 parties	 have	 received	 little	 academic	 attention	 thus	 far,	 a	 notable	 recent	
exception	 is	Kimberly	Cowell-Meyers’s	 (2016)	comparative	analysis,	which	offers	a	concise	
definition	of	these	organisations:	
	
Women’s	parties	are	autonomous	organizations	of	or	for	women	that	run	candidates	
for	 elected	 office.	 What	 makes	 them	 women’s	 parties	 is	 the	 explicit	 agenda	 to	
advance	 the	 volume	 and	 range	 of	 women’s	 voices	 in	 politics.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	
women’s	party	 is	an	organ	designed	specifically	and	primarily	 to	 increase	women’s	
representation	in	politics	(Cowell-Meyers,	2016:	4).	
	
As	 Cowell-Meyers	 observes,	 women’s	 parties	 typically	 emerge	 because	 of	 the	 failure	 of	
mainstream	 political	 parties	 to	 include	 women	 and	 women’s	 issues,	 and	 can	 serve	 as	
important	channels	of	representation	and	mobilisation	for	women.	Although	usually	small	in	
terms	 of	 membership,	 women’s	 parties	 can	 challenge	 mainstream	 parties	 to	 address	
women’s	 issues	 (Levin,	 1999),	whilst	 also	utilising	 consciousness-raising	 tactics	 to	educate	
women	about	feminism	and	gender	inequality	(Zaborszky,	1987).		
	
Existing	 studies	 of	 women’s	 parties	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 are	 a	 response	 to	 the	
marginalisation	of	women	in	political	decision-making	and	established	parties.	Indeed,	while	
women’s	parties	may	differ	 in	terms	of	how	they	conceive	of	 ‘women’s	 interests’,	broadly	
defined,	 they	 share	 a	 common	 agenda	 that	 ‘reflects	 a	 perception	 of	 exclusion	 from	
mainstream	 political	 processes’	 (Cowell-Meyers,	 2016:	 16;	 emphasis	 added).	 In	 terms	 of	
emergence,	women’s	parties	are	more	likely	to	emerge	when	a	gap	exists	between	levels	of	
women’s	 political	 representation	 and	 levels	 of	 women’s	 workforce	 participation	 (Cowell-
Meyers,	 2016).	 Hence,	 women’s	 parties	 emerge	 in	 contexts	 where	 women	 are	 unevenly	
empowered,	and	should	be	seen	as	an	 indication	of	 the	 ‘failures’	of	 the	established	party	
system	to	include	women	(Cowell-Meyers,	2016:	23).	They	are	also	more	likely	to	emerge	in	
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historical	 moments	 characterised	 by	 electoral	 uncertainty,	 transition	 and	 institutional	
‘newness’	(Cowell-Meyers,	2011),	before	party	support	bases	crystallize.							
	
Whilst	 much	 has	 been	 written	 on	 the	 ‘decline’	 of	 political	 parties,	 part	 of	 the	 specific	
electoral	 appeal	 of	 women’s	 parties	 is	 their	 antecedents	 within	 the	 wider	 women’s	
movement	 (Cowell-Meyers,	 2016).	 Reinforcing	 the	 narrative	 that	 they	 have	 emerged	
organically	from	within	existing	grassroots	networks,	therefore,	becomes	an	important	way	
in	 which	 women’s	 parties	 can	 distinguish	 themselves	 from	 the	 ‘distrusted’	 mainstream	
parties	(Cowell-Meyers,	2014).	Whilst	some	women’s	parties	are	 indeed	largely	comprised	
of	 activists	 from	 the	 women’s	 movement	 with	 no	 prior	 experience	 of	 electoral	 politics	
(Zaboszky,	 1987),	 other	 studies	 highlight	 that	 these	 parties	 are	 often	 led	 by	 elite	women	
with	previous	political	experience	(Ishiyama,	2003;	Bjarnegård	and	Freidenvall,	2015),	which	
can	 sometimes	 create	 tensions	 between	 the	 party	 in	 office	 and	 the	 wider	 women’s	
movement	(Dominelli	and	Jonsdottir,	1988).		
	
Women’s	 parties,	 which	 often	 claim	 to	 ‘do’	 politics	 differently	 than	 mainstream	 male-
dominated	 parties,	 tend	 to	 adopt	 non-hierarchical	 and	 decentralised	 power	 structures	
(Dominelli	and	Jonsdottir,	1988).	Of	course,	party	organisational	dynamics	change	over	time	
–	and	may	cause	tensions	when	the	business	of	selecting	candidates	and	fighting	elections	
begins.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	 Icelandic	women’s	party	Kwenna	Frambothid	 (KF),	 for	example,	
the	 organisational	 dynamics	 of	 the	 party	 shifted	 once	 the	 party	 gained	 seats	 on	 the	 city	
council	(Dominelli	and	Jonsdottir,	1988).	While	the	party	continued	to	hold	regular	meetings	
with	 its	 supporters,	 organised	 as	 non-hierarchical	 forums	 aimed	 at	 facilitating	 democratic	
dialogue,	the	party	quickly	slipped	into	the	‘enactment	of	traditional	leadership	roles’,	and	
soon	 found	 itself	 making	 policy	 and	 political	 decisions	 without	 the	 mandate	 of	 the	
grassroots	membership	(Dominelli	and	Jonsdottir,	1988:	44).	
	
Studies	 of	 smaller	 parties	 show	 that	 they	 tend	 to	 do	 better	 when	 proportional	 electoral	
systems	are	in	place,	allowing	voters	to	cast	their	vote	for	more	than	one	party,	and	in	more	
fragmented	party	systems,	where	smaller	parties	become	more	viable	(Mair,	1997).	In	these	
analyses,	 ‘success’	 for	 new	parties	 is	 usually	 defined	 in	 electoral	 terms,	 focusing	on	 seats	
and	vote	share.	On	this	measure,	women’s	parties	have	limited	success	-	they	are	generally	
short-lived	organisations	lasting	on	average	two	to	three	electoral	cycles	and	pick	up	few	(if	
any)	seats	(Cowell-Meyers,	2016).	And	while,	historically,	some	women’s	parties	have	made	
notable	electoral	inroads	(Dominelli	and	Jonsdottir,	1988;	Levin,	1999),	these	have	generally	
been	 followed	by	dramatic	 collapses	 in	electoral	 support	 (Ishiyama,	2003;	Cowell-Meyers,	
2016).	Accordingly,	part	of	the	electoral	strategy	adopted	by	women’s	parties	has	been	to	
frame	 themselves	 as	 non-partisan	 in	 order	 to	 broaden	 their	 electoral	 appeal	 (Cowell-
Meyers,	2016).	
	
If	women’s	parties	are	unlikely	to	gain	electoral	success	or	to	be	long-term	players	within	a	
political	 system,	 then	 why	 should	 they	 be	 of	 interest?	 	 For	 women’s	 parties,	 electoral	
success	 is	 not	 always	 the	 goal:	 they	 can	 impact	 women’s	 descriptive	 and	 substantive	
representation	by	pressuring	other	 larger	parties	 to	 increase	women’s	 representation	and	
to	pay	attention	to	women’s	policy	concerns.	Women’s	parties	have	an	impact	on	women’s	
representation	by	‘improving	women’s	status	in	other	parties’,	rather	than	by	winning	large	
amounts	of	votes	or	seats	on	their	own	(Cowell-Meyers,	2016:	5;	see	also	Cowell-Meyers,	
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2017).	 For	 example,	 Levin’s	 (1999)	 analysis	 of	 the	 Israeli	 Women’s	 Party	 highlights	 its	
primary	 goal	 of	 consciousness-raising,	 rather	 than	 winning	 votes,	 but	 also	 points	 to	 the	
party’s	substantive	impact	on	the	manifestos	of	larger	parties.	Meanwhile,	Cowell-Meyers’s	
(2011,	2014)	analysis	of	the	Northern	Ireland	Women’s	Coalition	highlights	its	importance	in	
placing	gender	equality	on	 the	agenda	of	 the	other	Northern	 Irish	parties,	despite	 its	 low	
vote	share.	However,	the	potential	impact	of	women’s	parties	on	women’s	representation	is	
still	 shaped	 by	 the	 dynamics	 of	 electoral	 competition	 and	 the	wider	 institutional	 context	
(Cowell-Meyers,	2011).	For	women’s	representation	and	issues	of	gender	equality	to	‘catch	
on’	–	in	what	is	often	referred	in	the	literature	as	a	process	of	‘contagion’	(cf.	Matland	and	
Studlar,	1996;	see	also	Cowell-Meyers,	2011,	Kenny	and	Mackay,	2014)	–	women’s	parties	
must	pose	a	degree	of	electoral	‘threat’	to	established	parties	in	order	for	their	claims	to	be	
taken	seriously.	
	
Women’s	parties	are,	therefore,	important	organisations	that	speak	to	a	number	of	debates	
within	political	science,	especially	those	concerned	with	the	unequal	distribution	of	political	
power,	 the	dynamics	of	party	organisation	and	 competition,	 and	 the	 links	between	 social	
movements	actors,	civil	society	and	the	formal	political	process.	In	particular,	we	argue	that	
women’s	parties	 constitute	an	 important	 intervention	 in	 the	political	process,	highlighting	
the	 failures	 of	 the	 existing	 system	 to	 represent	women	 or	women’s	 issues	 and	 interests;	
whilst	at	the	same	time	offering	new	pathways	to	 inclusion	 in	terms	of	their	own	ways	of	
working,	 the	 substantive	 representation	 of	 women’s	 policy	 concerns,	 and	 their	 ability	 to	
pressure	other	parties	in	the	system.	Increasing	attention	is	being	paid	to	the	links	between	
social	movements	 and	 elections,	 and	 the	 variety	 of	 ways	 in	 which	movements	 can	 work	
with,	through	and	against	political	parties	to	effect	change	(Goldstone,	2003;	McAdam	and	
Tarrow,	2010;	Della	Porta,	Fernandez,	Kouki	and	Mosca,	2017).	WEP’s	status	as	‘movement-
parties’,	rather	than	pressure	groups,	therefore	affords	them	the	ability	to	contest	existing	
ideas	 and	 proposals	 directly	 through	 the	 electoral	 process,	 and	 potentially	 increase	 the	
access	 and	 inclusion	of	marginalized	 groups	 in	 the	policy-making	process	 (Cowell-Meyers,	
2014).	At	the	same	time,	they	provide	fascinating	insights	into	the	difficulties	and	challenges	
that	 face	 activists	 as	 they	 seek	 to	 work	 with	 and	 within	 institutional	 and	 organisational	
frameworks	that	have	long	proven	inhospitable	for	feminists.			
	
RESEARCH	DESIGN	AND	METHODS	
	
Research	 on	 gender	 and	 political	 parties	 has	 a	 tradition	 of	 multi-method	 approaches,	
making	use	of	interviews,	surveys,	focus	groups	and	semi-ethnographic	methods	(Norris	and	
Lovenduski,	1995).	Increasingly,	research	in	this	area	has	conceptualised	political	parties	as	
gendered	organizations,	 focusing	not	 only	 on	 formal	 party	 rules	 and	 regulations,	 but	 also	
informal	 norms	 and	 party	 practices	 and	 their	 gendered	 effects	 (Lovenduski,	 2005;	 Kenny,	
2013;	Bjarnegård,	2013;	Kenny	and	Verge	2016).	As	studies	in	this	area	have	noted,	informal	
party	 rules	 are	notoriously	difficult	 to	 research	 (Bjarnegård	and	Kenny,	 2015).	 Large-scale	
cross-national	studies	have	the	potential	to	identify	interesting	patterns	and	give	a	sense	of	
the	wider	global	context	(Kittilson,	2006);	however,	uncovering	the	informal	and	gendered	
dimensions	of	political	parties	requires	in-depth	and	detailed	qualitative	work.		
	
Thus,	studies	of	gender	and	political	parties	often	rely	on	in-depth	interviews	to	understand	
the	‘way	things	are	done’	(Evans,	2011;	Bjarnegård,	2013;	Kenny,	2013).	Rather	than	make	a	
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strict	separation	between	informal	and	formal	rules	or	prejudge	their	relative	significance,	
these	studies	 instead	see	the	mix	of	elements	as	an	empirical	question.	This	 requires	that	
researchers	talk	to	actors	themselves	about	‘how	things	are	done	around	here’	and	‘why	is	X	
done,	 but	 not	 Y?’	 (Lowndes,	 2014:	 688).	 Such	 an	 approach	 is	 important	 not	 just	 to	
understand	 the	 role	 of	 informal	 rules,	 but	 also	 to	 investigate	whether	 or	 not	 the	 formal	
rules	found	in	official	party	statements	really	do	structure	behaviour	on	the	ground.	
	
This	was	 particularly	 important	 in	 the	 case	 of	WEP,	where	many	 of	 the	 party	 rules	were	
either	not	written	down,	or	were	in	the	process	of	being	written	down	as	we	conducted	our	
research.	 Interviews	 were	 often	 the	 most	 effective	 method	 for	 understanding	 decision-
making	with	 regards	 to	organisation,	 candidate	 selection	and	policy-making.	Our	 research	
draws	 on	 interviews	 with	 party	 activists,	 candidates,	 staff,	 branch,	 steering	 and	 policy	
committee	members,	as	well	as	with	 representatives	 from	national	and	regional	women’s	
organisations	 to	 explore	 their	 responses	 to	 and	 relationship	 with	WEP.	We	 focus	 in	 this	
paper	on	the	period	between	the	party’s	initial	formation	in	July	2015,	and	its	first	elections	
in	which	it	stood	candidates	in	May	2016,	up	to	its	first	party	conference	in	November	2016.	
Alongside	 formal	 interviews	 and	 document	 analysis,	 we	 have	 also	 made	 use	 of	 ‘rapid	
ethnographic’	techniques,	undertaking	‘short	intensive	and	focussed	investigations’	to	gain	
a	greater	understanding	of	party	dynamics	at	work	‘on	the	ground’	(Galea	et	al,	2015).		
	
THE	WOMEN’S	EQUALITY	PARTY:	EMERGENCE	
	
We	expect	women’s	parties	to	emerge	in	contexts	with	favourable	institutional	opportunity	
structures,	 and,	 in	 particular,	 where	women	 are	 unevenly	 empowered.	 However,	 the	 UK	
presents	 a	 closed	 opportunity	 structure	 for	 women’s	 parties.	 The	 UK	 is	 an	 established	
democracy	that	presents	significant	barriers	for	small	parties,	including	the	substantial	vote	
threshold	 required	 for	 first-past-the-post	elections	 to	 the	House	of	Commons,	an	 issue	 to	
which	we	return	later.		And	while	British	political	parties	are	far	from	fully	‘feminized’	–	with	
respect	to	either	the	integration	of	women	or	the	integration	of	women’s	policy	concerns	–	
all	 of	 the	main	parties	have	 responded	 to	women’s	demands	 for	 individual	 and	 collective	
representation	(Childs,	2008).	In	particular,	the	Labour	Party	has	sought	to	capitalise	on	its	
position	 as	 the	 party	 for	women,	 playing	 a	 crucial	 innovating	 role	 in	 promoting	women’s	
representation	in	both	UK	and	devolved	elections	(Annesley	et	al,	2007;	Kenny	and	Mackay,	
2014).	 	Our	analysis	of	WEP’s	emergence	 focuses	on	 two	 inter-related	questions:	why	did	
the	party	launch	in	2015?	And	what	is	its	relationship	to	and	with	the	women’s	movement?	
We	 find	 that	 the	uncertain	political	 climate	post-2010	and	 the	 rise	of	other	newer	 voices	
within	UK	politics	proved	to	be	an	important	factor	in	WEP’s	emergence.	However,	despite	
the	presence	of	 a	 vibrant	women’s	movement,	 the	party	 emerged	 alongside,	 rather	 than	
from	within	the	ranks	of	activists	and	established	networks,	which	has	at	times	created	an	
uneasy	relationship	between	the	two.		
	
In	many	respects	2015	was	a	surprising	year	for	the	 launch	of	a	women’s	party	 in	the	UK.	
The	 2015	 general	 election	 witnessed	 the	 highest	 number	 and	 percentage	 of	 women	
candidates.	Labour’s	continued	use	of	all-women	shortlists	meant	that	43	per	cent	of	their	
parliamentary	party	were	women;	the	Conservative	party	expanded	the	number	of	women	
MPs	 to	 21	 per	 cent	 of	 their	 parliamentary	 party;	 and	 the	 gains	 made	 by	 the	 Scottish	
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National	Party	(SNP)	increased	the	overall	number	of	women	MPs	to	191	–	an	all-time	high	
(29.4	per	cent),	though	still	well	short	of	parity.		
	
In	other	respects,	however,	WEP’s	emergence	reflects	a	broader	story	of	political	and	party	
change	and	electoral	uncertainty	 in	UK	politics.	The	2010	General	Election	 resulted	 in	 the	
first	 coalition	 government	 in	 the	UK	 for	 seventy	 years,	 and,	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 2015,	many	
were	 predicting	 another	 hung	 Parliament.	 Whilst	 the	 May	 2015	 elections	 returned	 a	
Conservative	majority	government,	it	also	resulted	in	a	shake-up	of	‘business	as	usual’,	with	
the	 electoral	 wipe-out	 of	 the	 Labour	 party	 in	 Scotland	 (and	 the	 subsequent	 election	 of	
Jeremy	 Corbyn	 as	 Labour	 leader),	 and	 the	 significant	 electoral	 growth	 of	 the	 UK	
Independence	 Party	 (UKIP).	 	 As	 with	 new	 parties	 elsewhere,	 UKIP	 capitalised	 on	 wider	
trends	of	partisan	dealignment	and	economic	and	social	change	 in	Britain,	channelling	the	
frustrations	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘left	 behind’	 (Ford	 and	Goodwin,	 2014).	 UKIP	was	 frequently	
cited	as	a	comparator	example	in	media	coverage	of	WEP2;	indeed,	interviewees	highlighted	
the	rise	of	UKIP	as	a	key	factor	shaping	the	launch	of	their	party:		
	
The	point	that	[WEP]	made	at	the	beginning	was	that	they	were	differentiating	
themselves	from	a	campaigning	group	because	they	were	seeking	real	political	
power,	and	that	was	what	was	going	to	create	a	threat	to	mainstream	politics.	It	was	
a	new	approach,	and	it	seemed	to	make	sense,	and	we’ve	seen	it	work	with	UKIP.3	
	
As	with	other	women’s	parties,	WEP’s	initial	framing	of	 its	message	very	much	focused	on	
the	perception	of	 exclusion	 from	mainstream	political	 processes,	 arguing	 that	 established	
political	parties	were	not	prioritizing	women’s	issues,	and	highlighting	persistent	patterns	of	
gender	inequality	in	the	UK:	‘WE	are	not	going	to	wait	for	equality,	WE	are	going	to	make	it	
happen	 –	 now’	 (Women’s	 Equality	 Party,	 2016b).	 This	message	was	 reiterated	 by	 Sophie	
Walker	 in	 the	run-up	to	the	May	2016	elections,	where	she	argued	that	 ‘all	of	 the	parties	
have	 competing	 priorities,	 and	 they	 are	 simply	 unable	 to	 give	 [women’s	 issues]	 the	
attention	 they	 need.’4	 Indeed,	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 main	 British	 parties	 had	 failed	 to	
integrate	 women	 in	 decision-making	 processes	 and	 represent	 women’s	 interests	 was	
articulated	by	several	interviewees	within	the	party:	
	
None	of	the	other	parties	had	really	taken	gender	seriously	and	I	was	really	excited	
that	there	was	this	opportunity	to	shake	things	up.5	
	
The	other	parties,	 they	 just	don’t	 really	 seem	to	have	anything	much	 to	 say	about	
women.6	
	
WEP’s	emergence	also	coincided	with	a	wider	and	sustained	resurgence	of	the	UK	feminist	
movement7	 (Evans	 and	Chamberlain,	 2014;	 Evans,	 2015).	 Studies	 on	women’s	 activism	 in	
the	UK	have	noted	that	over	the	past	decade	or	so,	the	number	of	grassroots	organisations	
has	increased,	as	has	the	range	of	issues	which	they	seek	to	address.	For	instance,	whilst	the	
anti-violence	against	women	sector	is	well-established	in	the	UK,	it	has	been	strengthened	
in	 recent	 years	 by	 new	 and	 emerging	 groups	 and	 campaigns	 (Mackay,	 2015).	 Studies	
exploring	the	impact	of	government	cuts	on	some	of	the	most	vulnerable	women	in	society	
have	emphasised	 the	 role	of	ethnic	minority	women	 in	anti-austerity	activism	 (Bassel	and	
Emejulu,	2017);	whilst	a	neo-imperialist	 foreign	policy	and	Islamophobic	cultural	discourse	
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has	 led	 to	 a	 growing	 visibility	 of	 Muslim	 women’s	 activism	 (Joly	 and	 Wadia,	 2017).	
Meanwhile,	 the	 size	 and	 scope	 of	 feminist	 societies	 on	UK	University	 campuses	 indicates	
that	there	is	a	younger	generation	of	(mainly)	women	who	are	eager	to	engage	in	women’s	
activism	(Evans,	2016).		Within	this	context,	one	might	expect	WEP	to	have	emerged	out	of	
the	 women’s	 movement,	 as	 has	 been	 the	 case	 with	 previous	 women’s	 parties	 (Cowell-
Meyers,	2014).	However,	our	 research	complicates	 this	 theory	and	 in	 fact	 reveals	a	set	of	
tensions	between	the	party	and	the	wider	movement.		
	
Interviews	 with	 activists	 involved	 in	 WEP	 revealed	 patchy	 knowledge	 of	 the	 women’s	
movement.	Whilst	many	 interviewees	 named	 large	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 specifically	
The	Fawcett	Society,	as	having	played	a	key	role	in	advancing	women’s	interests,	there	was	
relatively	little	awareness	of,	or	experience	of	working	with,	smaller	or	emerging	grassroots	
groups.	 In	 terms	 of	 previous	 engagement	 with	 the	 women’s	 movement,	 some	 had	
participated	in	large-scale	events	such	as	Reclaim	the	Night,	but	most	did	not	appear	to	be	
networked	within	 the	women’s	movement,	 something	 reflected	 in	 an	 interview	with	 one	
activist:	‘I’ve	always	supported	women’s	rights	but	I’ve	never	really	done	anything	about	it	
which	is	why	this	[joining	WEP]	appealed.’8	WEP	interviewees	often	highlighted	a	sense	of	
disconnect	with	the	women’s	movement,	as	well	as	recurring	problems	of	‘treading	on	the	
toes’	of	the	women’s	sector.9		
	
This	sense	of	disconnect	between	WEP	and	the	party	was	also	observed	by	representatives	
from	women’s	organisations,	who	expressed	some	irritation	that	the	party	had	not	sought	
to	engage	with	the	wider	movement:	
	
WEP	engagement	with	 and	 knowledge	of	 the	 activist	movement	 is	minimal.	More	
lone	 wolves	 than	 activists	 really	 -	 very	 little	 appreciation	 of	 the	 strong	 activist	
networks	who	have	been	plugging	away	for	decades.10		
	
WEP	 don’t	 really	 seem	 to	 have	 formal	 links	 with	 the	 women’s	 lib	 movement	 or	
whatever	there	is	of	it	or	could	be	seen	to	be	of	it.	Yes	it’s	strained.11		
	
The	depiction	of	 the	party	 as	 ‘lone	wolves’	 rather	 than	 ‘activists’	 is	 telling,	 and	hints	 at	 a	
perception	 of	 the	 party	 as	 newcomers	 with	 little	 appreciation	 for	 either	 the	 historical	
context	or	political	gains	achieved	by	the	women’s	movement.		This	interpretation	was	also	
reflected	in	a	piece	by	well-known	activist	Holly	Dustin	on	the	feminist	website	Trouble	and	
Strife	(2016).	 In	evaluating	the	party’s	commitment	to	 ‘creating	policy	from	the	grassroots	
up’,	Dustin	argued	that	the	party	risked	‘reinventing	the	wheel’.	For	example,	in	relation	to	
their	policy	on	violence	against	women	and	girls,	WEP	had	failed	to	recognize	that	a	cross-
party	VAW	strategy	already	existed	at	Westminster,	one	that	activists	had	spent	a	long	time	
helping	 to	establish	and	which	WEP,	 in	 launching	 its	own	policy	 in	 this	area,	had	 failed	 to	
acknowledge.	 In	 short,	 the	 charge	was	 that	 the	 party	wasn’t	 sufficiently	 grounded	 in	 the	
knowledge	 and	 networks	 of	 the	 women’s	 movement,	 to	 be	 able	 to	 actually	 deliver	 for	
women.		
	
Partly	 in	 response	to	the	early	criticism	they	received	 from	the	women’s	movement,	WEP	
included	within	their	manifesto	a	commitment	to	the	‘Nordic	model’	of	prostitution	which	
criminalizes	 the	 purchase,	 but	 not	 selling,	 of	 sex	 and	 is	 traditionally,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 UK,	
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associated	with	radical	feminism.	We	suggest	that	WEP	adopted	this	policy,	at	least	in	part,	
in	 reaction	 to	 the	 early	 criticism	 that	 they	 attracted	 from	 sections	 of	 the	 women’s	
movement.	Adopting	 such	 a	 position	has	 enabled	 the	party	 to	 establish	 a	 better	working	
relationship	with	key	groups.	This	interpretation	is	supported	by	one	interviewee	who	noted	
that	 it	was	 important	 for	 the	party’s	 	 ‘credibility’,	and	would	ensure	that	 they	were	taken	
seriously	 by,	 the	 wider	 women’s	 movement.12	 Interviews	 with	 women’s	 organizations	
suggested	 that	 this	was	one	policy	 area	where	 some	 sections	of	 the	women’s	movement	
had	 actively	 lobbied	 the	 new	 party,	 highlighting	 that	 the	 party’s	 grassroots	 policy	
development	 process	 provides	 a	 potential	 route	 by	 which	 women’s	 movement	
organisations	can	mobilize	to	lobby	for	the	inclusion	of	specific	policies	in	the	party’s	formal	
platform.	 Local	 activists	 we	 interviewed	 were	 unsure	 as	 to	 why	 this	 specific	 contentious	
policy	 issue	had	been	adopted	as	party	policy;	 indeed	 some	 thought	 that	 the	party	 could	
change	its	position	if	‘further	evidence’	was	provided.13	
	
The	tension	between	those	active	in	the	women’s	movement	and	WEP	was	also	identified	
by	 some	 interviewees	 in	Scotland,	where	 the	 civic	awakening	 that	accompanied	 the	2014	
independence	referendum	saw	a	resulting	surge	 in	women’s	grassroots	activism,	 including	
the	 establishment	 of	 groups	 like	 Women	 for	 Independence.	 Indeed,	 as	 one	 Scottish	
interviewee	noted:	
	
If	Women	for	Indy	had	become	a	political	party,	I	would	have	joined	in	a	heartbeat.	
But	unfortunately	they	didn’t	become	a	political	party,	and	then,	almost	immediately	
WEP	arose,	so	I	joined	as	a	founding	member.14	
	
WEP’s	emergence,	then,	does	not	constitute	a	‘tactic’	adopted	by	the	women’s	movement	
to	further	advance	the	cause	of	women’s	equality,	calling	into	question	whether	 it	fits	the	
classification	 of	 a	 ‘movement-party’	 (cf.	 Cowell-Meyers,	 2016).	 Being	 considered	 an	
effective	 outsider	 to	 an	 energized	 and	 vibrant	 women’s	movement	 has	meant	 that	WEP	
have	had	 to	 contend	with	both	 the	criticism	 from	women	within	existing	political	parties,	
who	resent	the	implication	that	it	is	only	through	the	creation	of	a	new	women’s	party	that	
women’s	 equality	 can	 be	 achieved,	 but	 also	 the	 charge	 from	 activists	 that	 the	 party	
represents	a	top-down	approach	to	political	organising,	which	we	consider	below.			
	
WOMEN’S	EQUALITY	PARTY:	ORGANISATION	
	
Women’s	parties	 are	 ‘organisationally	 new	actors’	with	 lower	 levels	 of	 institutionalisation	
(cf.	 Bolleyer	 et	 al,	 2012,	 p.	 973;	 Mair,	 1999)	 –	 which	 means	 that	 their	 party	 rules	 and	
organisational	structures	are	less	consolidated,	more	basic,	and	more	open	to	change	than	
those	of	established	mainstream	parties.	This	is	certainly	the	case	for	WEP,	which	continues	
to	 be	 marked	 by	 a	 large	 degree	 of	 organisational	 fluidity	 as	 the	 party	 establishes	 its	
infrastructure.	 In	 the	 first	 year	 of	 its	 existence,	 the	 party	 was	 governed	 by	 central	
headquarters,	 which	 employed	 six	 people	 (including	 party	 leader	 Sophie	 Walker,	 and	
additional	 staff	 focused	 on	 policy	 and	 elections).	 WEP	 did	 not	 initially	 establish	 the	
equivalent	 of	 a	 national	 executive	 committee,	which	meant	 that,	 in	 practice,	 all	 strategic	
decisions	were	taken	by	the	leadership.		
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The	 party	 subsequently	 put	 into	 place	 a	 written	 constitution,	 adopted	 at	 the	 first	 party	
conference	 in	 November	 2016	 (Women’s	 Equality	 Party,	 2016c).	 The	 Constitution	
established	a	structure	with	an	Executive	Committee,	responsible	for	the	Party’s	operational	
decisions;	 a	 Steering	 Committee,	 as	 the	 Party’s	 main	 decision-making	 body	 between	
Conferences;	 and	 a	 Policy	 Committee,	 focused	 on	 the	 Party’s	 core	 policy	 areas.	 Party	
members	are	elected	to	the	Steering	Committee	through	a	combination	of	simple	majority	
vote	 at	 Party	Conference	or	 random	 selection	 through	 the	party	membership	database15.	
Policy	 Committee	 members,	 meanwhile,	 are	 elected	 by	 a	 simple	 majority	 vote	 at	 Party	
Conference,	 encompassing	 policy	 spokespeople	 and	 ‘movement-builders’	 focused	 on	 the	
party’s	 key	 policy	 areas,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 policy	 spokesperson	 and	 movement-builder	 for	
Scotland.	 Below	 this	 level,	 the	 party	 has	 several	 regional	 ‘hubs’,	 which	 facilitate	
collaboration	between	local	branches,	though	these	do	not	exist	across	all	parts	of	the	UK.	
This	is	then	followed	by	local	branches,	which	have	a	minimum	of	three	appointed	officers	–	
a	Branch	Leader,	Data	Manager,	and	a	Treasurer	–	though	they	may	appoint	other	officers	
as	they	see	fit.	Finally,	members	and	registered	supporters	make	up	the	membership	of	the	
branches.		
	
Our	 analysis	 reveals	WEP	 to	 have	 so	 far	 remained	highly	 centralised	 –	 there	 is	 no	 formal	
regional	representation	on	the	Steering	Committee,	and	decisions	are	still	often	made	at	the	
centre,	 with	 the	 party	 thus	 far	 resisting	 wider	 decentralizing	 pressures.	 Criticisms	 have	
arisen	over	whether	 the	party	 is	 too	 ‘London-centric’,	given	 in	particular	 that	 its	 founders	
are	all	London-based	media	professionals,	a	charge	which	the	party	has	consciously	tried	to	
avoid:	
	
We	 are	 determined	 not	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 London	 party	 –	 so	 much	 so	 that	 we’ve	
prioritised	the	branches	being	set	up	in	Lincoln	over	those	set	up	in	London	–	we	put	
Lincoln	before	West	Ealing.16			
	
At	the	party’s	2016	conference,	for	example,	several	motions	were	proposed	with	regards	
to	devolution	–	including	a	joint	proposal	for	a	constitutional	amendment	from	the	Stirling	
and	Lothian	branches	pushing	for	a	national	Scottish	hub.	This	was	voted	down	by	the	party	
conference,	with	a	central	party	staff	member	speaking	against	it.	As	above,	whilst	the	party	
does	 now	have	 the	 possibility	 for	 regional	 ‘hubs’	 to	 be	 formed	 and	 participate	 in	 central	
decision-making	structures,	these	are	branches	working	together,	rather	than,	for	example,	
a	 central	 Scottish	 headquarters	 as	 part	 of	 a	 federal	 or	 devolved	 party	 structure.	 As	 one	
Scottish	committee	member	noted:	
	
It’s	going	to	take	them	a	long	time	to	understand	Scotland,	and	the	fact	that	we	do	
have	 a	 different	 Parliament	 and	 that	we	 have	 devolved	matters	 that	 they	 are	 not	
taking	 into	consideration	when	they	are	making	some	of	their	announcements	and	
things.	It’s	very	London-centric.17	
	
How	a	party	organises	also	has	important	implications	for	internal	gender	power	dynamics,	
influencing	who	 has	 power	 and	 to	what	 degree	 (Childs,	 2013;	 Kenny	 and	 Verge,	 2016).	
Research	suggests	bureaucratized	party	rules	are	more	favourable	for	women	–	that	is,	rules	
that	are	not	only	formally	written	down,	but	are	also	actually	implemented	(Bjarnegård	and	
Zetterberg,	2016).	It	is	more	difficult	for	party	actors	to	discriminate	against	certain	types	of	
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candidates,	 for	 example,	 if	 the	 selection	 process	 is	 guided	 by	 clear	 and	 transparent	 rules	
with	sanctions	for	non-compliance	(Bjarnegård	and	Kenny,	2015).		Yet,	studies	of	women’s	
parties	 suggest	 that	may	be	 reluctant	 to	bureaucratize	party	 rules,	not	only	because	 they	
are	 ‘new’	 and	 are	 still	 in	 the	 process	 of	 developing	 formal	 frameworks,	 but	 also	 because	
they	do	not	want	to	reinforce	and	entrench	political	hierarchies	(Bjarnegård	and	Freidenvall,	
2015).		
	
At	the	time	of	our	research,	WEP	was	highly	informalized.	Few	rules	were	written	down,	and	
those	 that	 were	 written	 down	 were	 not	 necessarily	 followed.	 Candidate	 selection,	 for	
example,	 in	 the	 2016	 devolved	 and	 London	 Assembly	 elections	 operated	 through	 a	
centralized	application	process	–	with	branches	encouraged	to	nominate	candidates,	as	well	
as	 an	 online	 application	 form	 that	 was	 open	 to	 all	 members.	 Party	 spokeswomen	
emphasized	the	importance	of	doing	things	‘differently’	in	selecting	candidates	–	reflecting	
‘the	 uniqueness	 of	 our	 model	 and	 the	 newness	 of	 our	 party’	 (Women’s	 Equality	 Party,	
2016d).	Yet,	beyond	the	application	form	and	a	short	candidate	information	sheet	that	laid	
out	 very	broad	 selection	 criteria	 (Women’s	Equality	Party,	2016e),	 there	were	 few	 formal	
rules	in	place	for	the	selection	of	candidates,	and	those	rules	that	were	in	place	(formal	or	
informal)	 were	 inconsistently	 applied.	 In	 London,	 for	 example,	 where	 higher	 numbers	 of	
members	 applied	 to	 stand	 for	 office,	 the	 candidate	 shortlist	 was	 voted	 on	 by	 party	
members.	 Some	 candidates	 also	 went	 through	 a	 vetting	 process,	 with	 candidates	
interviewed	 by	 central	 HQ,	 and	 branch	 members	 consulted	 for	 their	 opinion.	 In	 others,	
there	 was	 no	 branch	 or	 member	 involvement	 in	 selection	 –	 candidates	 were	 selected	
without	an	interview	process	and	notified	directly	by	party	HQ	of	their	selection:		
	
I	got	a	phone	call.	I	applied,	and	then	within	a	week,	I	got	a	phone	call	[from	central	
HQ]	saying,	hello,	you	are	our	candidate	 […]	 it’s	a	good	 job	that	 [my	branch]	were	
nice	people,	you	know,	because	they	accepted	me	and	worked	with	me,	and	worked	
really	hard	for	me,	and	we’re	all	good	friends	now.	But	they	could	have	gone,	‘How	
dare	they	select	someone	we’ve	never	seen	in	our	lives	before.’18	
	
In	this	respect,	then,	WEP	resembles	a	more	traditional	male-dominated	party,	in	that	it	 is	
still	highly	 informalized	(though	this	 informality	 is	not	as	 institutionalised	as	 in	established	
parties)	(Bjarnegård	and	Freidenvall,	2015).	In	other	respects,	however,	the	party	has	tried	
to	organise	in	alternative	ways,	for	example	through	grassroots	policy	development,	which	
is	highlighted	in	the	party’s	first	policy	statement:	
	
[This	policy	statement]	has	been	shaped	by	our	members	and	supporters,	thousands	
of	whom	have	contributed,	working	collaboratively	with	experts	and	policy	makers	
online	and	at	events	across	the	country	(Women’s	Equality	Party,	2015).	
	
Allowing	 members	 to	 have	 some	 say	 over	 the	 direction	 of	 policy	 is	 nothing	 new	 for	 UK	
parties:	 the	 Liberal	 Democrats	 allow	members	 to	 propose	 and	 vote	 on	 policy	 proposals,	
even	 if	 power	 ultimately	 resides	 with	 the	 party	 leadership	 (Evans	 and	 Sanderson-Nash,	
2012).	Such	mechanisms,	however,	can	support	‘value	infusion’	(Levitsky,	1998),	socialising	
party	members	into	the	organisation	and	leading	to	greater	engagement	and	investment	in	
the	 party.	 It	 also	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 for	WEP	 to	 facilitate	 member	 education,	 with	
members	 learning	 about	 policy,	 and	 policy	 development,	 through	 discussion	with	 others.	
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Some	WEP	 interviewees,	 however,	 highlighted	 the	 recruitment	 challenges	 that	 the	 party	
faced	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 particularly	 given	 many	 of	 the	 party’s	 members	 did	 not	 have	
previous	experience	in	campaigning	or	activism:	‘I	think	we’ll	do	really	well	getting	people	to	
pay	 their	 £4	 a	 month,	 coming	 to	 branch	 meetings,	 having	 their	 say,	 but	 not	 necessarily	
doing	the	major	legwork.’19			
	
There	 is	also	evidence	that	the	party	has	attempted	to	 learn	from	other	women’s	parties;	
for	 example,	 consciously	 adopting	 techniques	 of	 discussion	 moderation	 and	 collective	
decision-making	from	the	1980s	 Icelandic	women’s	party	 in	breakout	sessions	at	the	2016	
Party	 Conference.	 Yet,	 in	 other	 respects,	 the	 party	 remains	 a	 long	 way	 away	 from	 the	
organisational	ideals	held	by	many	of	its	activists,	including	traditional	methods	of	feminist	
organising.	 For	example,	whilst	 the	party	 stressed	 its	democratic	grassroots	policy-making	
process,	 some	 interviewees	 reported	 that	 policy	 amendments	proposed	by	members	had	
been	subsequently	reworded	by	central	HQ.	At	branch	level,	structures	are	not	horizontal,	
and	there	is	a	(often	unelected)	leader	and	steering	committee	that	take	decisions	on	behalf	
of	 the	branch.	Criticisms	have	also	been	 raised	of	 the	ways	 in	which	certain	decisions	are	
and	 have	 been	 taken	 by	 the	 centre	 without	 any	 consultation	 of	 the	 branches	 or	
membership,	 for	 instance	 the	 initial	 decision	not	 to	 take	 a	 position	on	 the	Brexit	 debate,	
which	 attracted	 some	 internal	 controversy.20	 And	 while	 the	 party	 does	 have	 new	
representative	structures	at	the	centre	–	including	a	Policy	Committee	–	some	members	felt	
that	 policy	 was	 still	 being	 driven	 by	 staff	 in	 central	 HQ,	 with	 the	 Policy	 Committee	
‘promoting’	pre-agreed	policies,	rather	than	leading	on	their	development.21	
	
WOMEN’S	EQUALITY	PARTY:	CHALLENGES		
	
If	WEP	are	to	somehow	overcome	the	pattern	that	has	dogged	other	women’s	parties	-	that	
they	 are	 short-lived	 and	 electorally	 unsuccessful	 (Ishiyama,	 2003;	 Cowell-Meyers,	 2016),	
then	they	must	think	carefully	about	how	to	address	two	key	 inter-related	challenges:	the	
electoral	system	and	the	party	system.	How	WEP	chooses	to	confront	these	difficulties	will	
shape	their	ability	to	exercise	power.	Although	women’s	parties	are	not	always	driven	by	the	
goal	of	electoral	success,	instead	stressing	the	importance	of	influencing	the	agenda	(Levin,	
1999);	WEP	themselves	have	repeatedly	emphasized	that	 the	way	to	exercise	power	 is	by	
contesting	and	winning	elections.		
	
Indeed,	WEP	have	tried	to	position	themselves	as	a	long-term	political	force,	a	theme	that	
party	 leader	 Sophie	 Walker	 repeatedly	 stressed	 after	 the	 2016	 elections,	 claiming	 that	
‘we’re	not	going	anywhere’.22	As	WEP’s	chief	policy	document	clearly	states:	‘Our	strategy	is	
straightforward:	to	win	seats	and	influence’	(Women’s	Equality	Party,	2015).	In	other	words,	
in	line	with	our	theoretical	expectations,	the	party	believes	that	in	order	to	exercise	power	it	
is	also	necessary	to	pose	a	credible	electoral	threat	to	the	mainstream	parties:		
	
We	have	a	bigger	presence	as	a	political	party	than	we	do	as	a	lobbying	group	or	a	
pressure	 group,	 or	 just	 a	 group	 of	 women	 online	 shouting	 about	 how	 unfair	 the	
world	 is.	My	 long-term	 goal	would	 be	 that	we	 do	 get	 some	people	 in	 parliament,	
both	Westminster	 and	 Holyrood	 and	Wales	 as	 well.	 That	 we	 do	 have	 some	 local	
councillors.23	
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[WEP’s	 contribution]	needs	 to	be	 to	get	people	 into	elected	positions,	 so	 they	can	
influencing	–	not	just	influencing,	but	we	can	make	alliances	and	our	votes	could	be	
very	important	for	influencing	policy	decisions.	So	I	guess	that’s	it	really,	we	need	to	
get	people	into	positions	of	power.24		
	
The	 party	 views	 electoral	 success	 as	 a	 key	 strategy	 for	 exercising	 power	 despite	 the	
significant	challenges	presented	by	the	UK	political	system.	For	a	small	party	to	thrive	in	the	
UK’s	political	system,	they	have	to	learn	to	negotiate	the	electoral	system.	At	the	UK	level,	
the	first-past-the-post	electoral	system	has	proven	particularly	hostile	to	small	parties.	Our	
observations	of	some	local	party	meetings	revealed	a	certain	degree	of	naiveté	with	regards	
this	particular	challenge.	 Indeed,	when	asked,	some	activists	were	not	aware	of	either	the	
different	electoral	 systems	 in	use	across	 the	UK,	or	what	 the	party’s	 strategy	might	be	 in	
different	elections	and	under	different	conditions.	Whilst	other	smaller	parties	have	sought	
to	build	themselves	up	incrementally	by	concentrating	their	efforts	on	specific	geographical	
areas	 (for	example,	 the	Liberal	Democrats;	see	Evans,	2011),	 for	a	women’s	party	with	no	
obvious	geographical	constituency,	the	task	 is	significantly	harder.	 In	the	case	of	WEP,	the	
party	took	advantage	of	the	more	favourable	institutional	opportunity	structure	presented	
by	 the	 devolved	 and	 London	 Assembly	 elections,	 which	 use	mixed	 proportional	 electoral	
systems	and	hence	are	theoretically	more	favourable	to	small	parties.	But,	ultimately	WEP	
did	not	win	any	seats	in	the	2016	elections,	although	its	share	of	the	vote	was	higher	than	
expected	in	some	areas,	particularly	in	London	(see	Table	1).25		
	
	
(INSERT	TABLE	1	HERE)	
	
WEP	were	able	 to	gain	 some	significant	media	coverage	during	 the	London	Mayoral	 race,	
with	party	leader	Sophie	Walker	participating	in	a	number	of	high	profile	debates	and	media	
interviews.	Given	that	the	Mayoral	race	 is	run	using	the	supplementary	vote	system,	WEP	
activists	were	able	to	encourage	voters	to	cast	their	second	vote	for	equality,	a	strategy	that	
worked	 well	 (see	 Table	 1).	 	 Meanwhile,	 one	 interviewee	 recounted	 that	 London	 Mayor	
Sadiq	 Khan	 had	 told	 the	 party	 that	 he	 was	 going	 to	 ‘steal	 their	 policies’,	 subsequently	
delivering	a	virtually	word	for	word	identical	speech	to	one	delivered	by	Walker.26	During	a	
general	election	it	will	obviously	be	much	harder	for	the	party	to	attract	attention,	however	
the	 party	 are	 confident	 that	 their	 very	 presence	 within	 an	 electoral	 race,	 even	 if	 the	
conditions	are	not	propitious,	will	enable	them	to	influence	the	agenda	of	other	mainstream	
parties.			
	
One	way	in	which	WEP	has	tried	to	distinguish	itself	electorally,	and	to	gain	a	foothold	in	the	
UK’s	 party	 system,	 is	 by	 adopting	 a	 ‘non-partisan’	 label;	 thereby	 allowing	 it	 to	 appeal	 to	
voters	on	the	left	and	the	right	as	well	as	facilitating	collaborative	partnerships	with	other	
parties	across	the	political	spectrum.	The	avoidance	of	the	left-right	dimension	was	a	tactic	
also	 adopted	 by	 the	 Swedish	 Feminist	 Initiative;	 although,	 as	 Bjarnegård	 and	 Freidenvall	
(2015)	 note,	 when	 pushed,	 the	 party	 leans	 left.	 Previous	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 non-
partisan	 political	 alternatives	 can	 be	 effective	 at	mobilising	 voters	 (Aars	 et	 al.,	 2005)	 and	
perhaps	more	importantly,	that	they	can	help	to	bridge	the	gap	between	parties	and	social	
movements	(Ignazi,	1996).	Meanwhile,	Cowell-Meyers	(2011)	argues	that	women’s	parties	
that	position	themselves	at	the	centre	of	the	political	spectrum	may	have	a	bigger	impact	on	
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the	agenda,	setting	off	processes	of	‘contagion’	amongst	electoral	rivals	on	both	the	left	and	
the	right.	
	
The	 party	 sought	 initially	 to	make	 something	 of	 a	 virtue	 of	 having	 neither	 economic	 nor	
foreign	policy	goals.	Some	party	members	saw	this	strategy	as	central	to	the	party’s	appeal	
to	the	electorate,	with	one	activist	noting	that	voters	‘didn’t	really	ask	too	much’	when	they	
were	 out	 canvassing.27	Others,	 however,	 highlighted	 the	 potential	 electoral	 trade-offs	 for	
the	party,	particularly	in	terms	of	recruiting	potential	members:		
	
It’s	 become	 quite	 difficult	 when	 you’re	 trying	 to	 talk	 to	 people,	 trying	 to	 recruit	
people,	when	 they	 say	 ‘How	does	 the	Women’s	Equality	Party	 feel	about	Trident’.	
That’s	 come	 up	 quite	 a	 lot	 in	 Scotland.	What	 do	we	 feel	 about	 the	 environment.	
About	the	economy.	And	it’s	trying	to	bring	all	those	arguments	back	to,	well,	how	
does	it	affect	women.28		
	
In	particular,	 the	party’s	 refusal	 to	take	a	stance	on	two	key	 issues	 in	the	first	years	of	 its	
development	–	Scottish	independence	and	the	EU	referendum		–	proved	controversial	with	
some	 members,	 who	 highlighted	 the	 irony	 of	 setting	 up	 a	 women’s	 party	 to	 represent	
women,	whilst	simultaneously	absenting	themselves	from	two	major	political	debates:	
	
I	 don’t	 know	what	 the	party’s	 view	would	be	of	 [Scottish	 independence].	 Because	
we’re	supposed	to	be	non-partisan.	And	I	think	if	it	came	to	it,	I	would	possibly	have	
to	leave	the	party.29			
	
I	 really	 thought	 about	 leaving	 after	 the	 decision	 not	 to	 campaign	 against	 Brexit	 –	
what’s	the	point	of	a	party	that	doesn’t	know	what	it’s	for.30	
	
	
As	the	above	quotations	indicate,	some	party	members	are	frustrated	by	the	(leadership’s)	
initial	decision	not	to	engage	with	such	pivotal	 issues	 in	UK	politics.	 Indeed,	activists	were	
fully	aware	of	the	irony	of	setting	up	a	women’s	party	to	ensure	women’s	voices	were	heard	
in	 political	 debate,	 whilst	 simultaneously	 absenting	 themselves	 from	 two	major	 debates.	
Such	 an	 approach	 says	much	 about	 their	 political	 aspiration,	which	 appears	 to	 be	 driven	
more	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 attract	 votes	 than	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 insert	 women’s	 voices	 into	 the	
debate.		
	
WEP’s	 non-partisan	 approach	 is	 also	 intended	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 create	 cross-party	
alliances.	In	other	countries,	women’s	parties	have	had	significant	effects	on	the	descriptive	
and	 substantive	 representation	 of	 women,	 particularly,	 but	 not	 exclusively,	 pressuring	
parties	on	 the	 left	 to	address	women’s	 issues	 (Styrkarsdottir,	 1986;	Cowell-Meyers,	2017)	
However,	WEP	has	run	into	trouble	 in	terms	of	 its	relationships	with	other	British	political	
parties	–	for	example,	initially	suggesting	at	some	party	events	and	meetings	that	members	
could	 join	 WEP	 while	 retaining	 their	 membership	 in	 other	 parties.	 This	 raised	 particular	
tensions	with	the	Labour	Party,	whose	party	rules	ask	members	to	confirm	that	they	are	not	
a	 registered	member	 of	 any	 other	 political	 party	 (save	 the	 Co-operative	 Party).31	 Indeed,	
interviews	with	 those	 involved	with	 Party	 HQ,	 and	with	 party	 activists,	 revealed	 that	 the	
Labour	party	had	been	particularly	hostile	at	both	UK	and	devolved	levels:	‘they	don’t	invite	
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us	to	anything	or	let	us	know	what’s	going	on.	They’re	too	tribal.’32	WEP	had	not	foreseen	
Labour’s	antagonism	toward	them.	Given	that	Labour	has	long	prided	itself	on	its	record	in	
delivering	 for	women,	 this	oversight	suggests	perhaps	a	 lack	of	understanding	of	 the	UK’s	
party	system.	 	The	party	has	managed	to	collaborate	with	other	parties,	 for	 instance	they	
worked	with	the	Liberal	Democrats	to	propose	an	amendment	to	the	Crime	and	Policing	Bill	
to	better	protect	victims	of	revenge	porn.	It	is	clear	that	if	they	wish	to	work	collaboratively	
with	Labour,	which	in	terms	of	size	and	electability	is	most	likely	to	be	able	to	bring	about	
change	at	UK	level,	then	a	clear	strategy	for	managing	that	relationship	is	required	in	order	
to	enhance	women’s	representation	and	impact	public	discourse	about	gender,	power	and	
(in)equality.		
	
	
CONCLUSION	
	
Studies	of	women’s	parties	provide	important	insights	into	political	power	-	specifically,	the	
dynamics	 of	 power	 within	 parties	 and	 between	 parties.	 Additionally,	 they	 reveal	 the	
contentious	and	sometimes	messy	ways	in	which	social	movements	can	work	with,	through	
and	against	political	parties.		Moreover,	their	very	presence	within	a	political	system	raises	
questions	 regarding	 representation,	 gender	 (in)equality	 and	 political	 inclusion	 and	
exclusion.				The	UK	Women’s	Equality	Party	is	a	new	and	rapidly	changing	party	that	is	still	
negotiating	its	own	direction	and	organisational	structure.	Nevertheless,	our	analysis	of	 its	
initial	 development	 suggests	 that	WEP	 is	 an	 important	 case	 for	 exploring	when	 and	why	
women’s	 parties	 emerge,	 how	 they	 organise	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 frame	 their	
message(s).	
	
Research	 on	 women’s	 parties	 argues	 that	 they	 are	 essentially	 a	 strategic	 tactic	 used	 by	
women’s	 movements	 to	 challenge	 their	 exclusion	 from	 decision-making	 through	 formal	
means,	usually	in	contexts	where	women	are	unevenly	empowered	and	where	the	electoral	
costs	of	entering	the	political	arena	are	low.	Our	findings	complicate	this:	on	the	one	hand,	
WEP	has	emerged	in	a	time	of	electoral	uncertainty	and	political	and	party	change;	on	the	
other	 hand,	 it	 faces	 a	 relatively	 closed	 political	 opportunity	 structure	 in	 terms	 of	 an	
unfavourable	electoral	system	at	UK	level,	and	an	established	(and	partially	feminized)	party	
system.	WEP	also	appears	to	be	distinct	in	that	it	has	emerged	alongside	but	not	necessarily	
from	 within	 the	 women’s	 movement,	 raising	 questions	 as	 to	 whether	 categorisations	 of	
women’s	parties	as	‘movement-parties’	hold	in	all	cases.		
	
WEP	 also	 provides	 an	 interesting	 case	with	 regards	 to	 the	 question	 of	whether	women’s	
parties	‘do	things	differently’,	in	terms	of	their	organisation	and	message.	WEP	has	tried	to	
set	 up	 alternative	 participatory	 structures	 and	 new	 ‘ways	 of	 working’,	 for	 example,	 its	
emphasis	thus	far	on	‘bottom	up’	grassroots	policy	development.	Concomitantly,	the	party	
has	fallen	back	on	more	traditional,	hierarchical	and	centralised	modes	of	party	organising	
and	leadership.	Of	particular	note	is	the	degree	of	informality	within	the	party,	raising	issues	
of	 accountability	 and	 transparency.	 While	 informality	 often	 poses	 problems	 in	 more	
established	 parties,	 tending	 to	 favour	 well-networked	 male	 candidates,	 this	 is	 not	
necessarily	 a	 problem	 in	 women’s	 parties,	 where	 the	 underlying	 ideology	 of	 the	 party	 is	
women-friendly.	But,	these	tensions	may	also	help	explain	why	women’s	parties	are	often	
short-lived	 organisations	 –	 the	 survival	 of	 new	 parties	 depends	 in	 part	 on	 their	 ability	 to	
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respond	 effectively	 to	 intra-organisational	 demands	 and	 pressures,	which	 requires	 formal	
rules	 and	 procedures	 for	 dealing	 with	 intra-party	 conflict	 between	 party	 sub-units,	 and	
between	activists	and	the	leadership.		
	
It	is	too	early	to	make	strong	claims	about	WEP’s	potential	impact	on	women’s	descriptive	
and	substantive	representation.	While	the	party	continues	to	run	for	subsequent	elections,	
it	has	not	yet	won	any	seats	–	losing	all	seven	of	its	electoral	deposits	in	the	2017	General	
Election,	and	attracting	controversy	over	its	decision	to	stand	against	sitting	Labour	women	
MPs.	The	party’s	electoral	impact	is	constrained	by	both	the	electoral	and	party	system,	and	
in	order	for	the	party	to	wield	any	significant	power,	either	in	terms	of	shaping	the	debate	
or	being	electorally	competitive,	the	party	requires	a	more	realistic	strategy	for	success	and	
a	closer	and	more	cooperative	relationship	with	the	wider	women’s	movement.			
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NOTES	
																																																						
1	The	party	itself	uses	the	acronym	‘WE’.	However,	for	grammatical	clarity,	we	refer	to	
‘WEP’	in	this	article.	
2	See,	for	example,	‘The	Women’s	Equality	Party	is	long	overdue’,	The	Guardian,	27	
September	2015;	‘Women’s	Equality	Party:	UKIP	for	women?’,	The	Telegraph,	20	October	
2015;	‘Women’s	Equality	Party	needs	a	strong	dose	of	Nigel	Farage’,	The	Telegraph,	22	
October	2015.		
3	WEP	Interview	5	
4	BBC	Daily	Politics	programme,	15	January	2016.	Available	at:	http://bbc.in/1lk7aNZ	
(Accessed	15	August	2016).	
5	WEP	Interview	4	
6	WEP	Interview	2	
7	The	documented	resurgence	of	feminist	activism	in	the	UK	has	ranged	from	innovative	
online	websites	set	up	to	document	sexism,	to	groups	established	to	oppose	the	
proliferation	of	pornography,	to	campaigns	to	help	deliver	more	women	in	Parliament,	as	
well	as	a	return	to	the	Reclaim	the	Night	Marches	of	the	1970s	(Mackay,	2015;	Evans,	2016).	
8	WEP	Interview	7	
9	WEP	Interview	12	
10	Women’s	Organisation	Interview	2	
11	Women’s	Organisation	Interview	3	
12	WEP	Interview	1.	
13	WEP	Interview	4.	
14	WEP	Interview	9	
15	If	a	randomly	selected	member	declines	the	role,	it	is	then	passed	randomly	on	to	another	
member,	until	all	positions	have	been	filled	(Women’s	Equality	Party,	2016c).	
16	WEP	Interview	6	
17	WEP	Interview	9.	
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18	Given	the	small	number	of	WEP	candidates,	we	have	not	identified	the	location	of	this	
interviewee.	
19	WEP	Interview	10	
20	In	July	2018	Sophie	Walker	called	upon	the	party	to	reconsider	this	stance	in	order	to	
campaign	for	a	second	referendum	or		‘People’s	Vote’,	The	Guardian	28	July	2018.		
21	WEP	Interview	12.	
22	‘Women’s	Equality	Party:	“The	Mayoral	Election	was	a	dress	rehearsal.	We’re	not	going	
anywhere”’,	The	Telegraph,	6	May	2016.	
23	WEP	Interview	10.	
24	WEP	Interview	9.	
25	The	party	did	particularly	well	in	capturing	the	second	preferences	in	the	Mayoral	race,	
targetng	the	fact	that	voters	could	‘afford’	to	give	WEP	their	second	vote.	This	tactic	was	
given	a	boost	when	Labour	candidate	(and	eventual	winner)	Sadiq	Khan	pledged	to	give	his	
second	vote	to	the	party.	
26	WEP	Interview	1	
27	WEP	Interview	4.	
28	WEP	Interview	10.	
29	WEP	Interview	9.	
30	WEP	Interview	3		
31	The	party	currently	offers	an	‘affiliate	membership’	for	those	who	are	a	member	of	
another	political	party.	
32	WEP	Interview	1.	
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